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The Relative Facts Interpretation and Everett’s note added in proof
1 Introduction
One of the benefits of considering metaphysical interpretations of physics is
that by doing so, one can hope to come to new and fruitful interpretations
of seminal pieces of work. I will argue that the development of what I take
to be the most charitable, faithful and conservative interpretation of Hugh
Everett’s pure wave mechanics, the relative facts interpretation, leads to a
new and interesting reading of probably the most famous quote of his dis-
sertation: the note added in proof. This note has given rise to such varied
interpretations of Everett as the many worlds, many minds, many histories
and many threads interpretations.1 I propose a new interpretation of Ev-
erett, the relative facts interpretation [RFI], that takes seriously Everett’s
placement of relative facts at the center of his work.
There are several difficulties facing any Everett interpreter: the ques-
tion of probability, the preferred basis problem, the problem of determinate
measurement records and how to make sense of Everett’s claim that “all
elements of a superposition (all “branches”) are “actual,” none any more
“real” than the rest.” What concerns me here is the latter of these. In what
follows I present the RFI, in brief, and show how it leads, by necessity, to a
new interpretation of the note added in proof using evidence found in letters
written by and to Everett. Given that this footnote is often the strongest
proof offered for any of the various interpretations of Everett, it is of vital
importance to the project of Everettian interpretation that one understands
this footnote properly.
2 The Relative Facts Interpretation
My interpretation of Everett, what I call the Relative Facts Interpretation
[RFI],2 has a straightforward proposal: there is but one world and it is pop-
1The relevant passage is quoted in full in the appendix.
2I borrow the name “relative facts” from Jeff Barrett’s discussion of Simon Saunders’
development of what I will call E-relativism ([3], p. 214-5). Insofar as Barrett’s discussion
is a discussion of Saunders, I believe it mistakenly characterizes Saunders’ position to be
one of a single-world interpretation. Insofar as Barrett’s discussion is of a single-world
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ulated by relative facts. By this I mean that generally all facts in the world
are relations, and this implies that generally all properties are relations.
When one considers the pure wave mechanics that Everett proposes, one
cannot help but be struck by the fact that generally every system will be in
an increasingly complex non-separable entanglement with the other systems
with which it interacts. Regardless of the position one takes on the measure-
ment problem and the collapse postulate, entanglement is an inescapable
part of the quantum mechanical world. This has led philosophers to argue
that non-separable, entangled quantum mechanical states imply that there
are relations that are strongly non-supervenient on non-relational properties
of their relata, and that this leads to quantum holism and a metaphysics
consisting of non-reducible relations ([6], [12], [13], [22], [25] and [43]). These
philosophers are not generally working in the context of pure wave mechanics,
but with a conception of quantum mechanics in some general, vague sense,
but this metaphysical picture can be used by the RFI to describe the world
modeled by Everett’s pure wave mechanics.
2.1 Absolute and Relative Facts in Everettian Quan-
tum Mechanics
2.1.1 Absolute Facts
When a system is in an eigenstate of an observable there is some absolute fact
about the value of that observable for the system, assuming that we preserve
the eigenvalue-eigenstate link—and we do. However, when a system is in a
non-separable entangled superposition, it is no longer possible to consider
one element of the superposition without also considering the rest of the
elements, again because of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link. We cannot then
say that there are any absolute facts about the components of the system
taken individually. Rather, there are only relative facts. These relative facts
do not supervene on any non-relational properties of their relata, but instead
supervene on some structural feature of the system such as a relation that
obtains between the components of the system.
Consider the example of two particles, p and q, in the singlet state:
relative facts interpretation, it describes the mechanism, due to Saunders, that the RFI
will use to explain determinate measurement records, but Barrett too quickly dismisses a
relative facts interpretation.
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|SSS〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑x〉p| ↓x〉q + | ↓x〉p| ↑x〉q)
.
If we consider the composite system consisting of p and q as isolated,
forgetting for a moment the ubiquity of correlations that prevents such a
system from being considered a truly isolated system, it is in an eigenstate
of some observable, let us call it components with opposite x-spin. Then
the eigenvalue-eigenstate link gives us that the system determinately has
the absolute property components with opposite x-spin. So, if we ask of the
system whether it has the absolute property components with opposite x-spin,
we will always get the answer “yes”.
2.1.2 Relative Facts
When p and q are in the singlet state, because of the eigenvalue-eigenstate
link, neither particle has any determinate absolute spin property independent
of the spin property of the other. However, each does have determinate
relative spin properties: p has the determinate (relative) property “x -spin
up relative to q being x -spin down” and the determinate (relative) property
“x -spin down relative to q being x -spin up”; q has the determinate (relative)
property “x -spin up relative to p being x -spin down” and the determinate
(relative) property “x -spin down relative to p being x -spin up”.
I formally define relative facts as follows: Suppose that S is a (proper)
subsystem of U , where U is the universe taken as an isolated system, and U
is in the state ψU = ΣiαiψiSψ
i
S′ , where S ′ is the complement of S; the state
of S ′, relative to S being ψiS , is ψiS′ .3 If Σ|αi|2 6= 1 for any i,4 then neither
system S nor S ′ have any absolute properties (or states). If we hit the vector
that represents S with the operator P , we will get that PψiS = +1, but we
3What we are essentially doing here is dividing up the terms of the universal state into
two subsets: the set of terms that make up the description of the state of the subsystem
S and the rest of the terms that make up the description of the state of the subsystem
S ′. Since S is a proper subset of U then the number of terms in S must be less than the
number in U . The choice we make about what terms make up S is arbitrary. The state
of S ′ is determined by the choice of terms that go to make up the description of the state
of S.
4If S is a proper subsystem of the global system U , then the sum of the square of the
norms of the coefficients will necessarily be less than 1 since S will just be a tensor product
of the entangled αi.
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do not want to say that this means that S has an absolute property, since
we have just argued that it does not. Rather, we have to also hit the vector
that represents S ′ with the operator Q, and determine its outcome. If we
get that QψiS′ = +1, then we can say, “S determinately has the property P,
relative to S ′ determinately having the property Q”. Likewise we can say,
“S ′ determinately has the property Q relative to S determinately having the
property P”.5 We can also express this by saying that there is a relative fact
that is true of both S and S ′.
To talk about the truth of propositions about systems in non-separable
entangled quantum mechanical states, let us again use the singlet state. If
we ask of the system whether p and q have opposite x -spins, we will get the
answer “yes” since the composite system is in an eigenstate of components
with opposite x-spin. If we ask of the system whether p, taken on its own,
has any determinate x -spin properties, we will get the answer “yes” since
in the first term, if our observer is a reliable and truthful observer,6 he will
report “yes”, and the same for the second term. This puts our observer in
an eigenstate of saying “yes”.
Now, suppose we ask of our system whether p, taken on its own, has the
determinate property x -spin up. Then our answer will be “no” since p is
not in an eigenstate of either x -spin up or x -spin down. The same is true
of q, taken on its own. However, if we ask whether p is x -spin up relative
to q being x -spin down, we will get the answer “yes”. The phrase relative
to directs us to apply the projection operator to just the term in which the
target of relativization appears with the property specified. In this case, we
are directed to the term in which q is x -spin down.
2.2 Objects
With our understanding of absolute and relative facts, the RFI gives rise
to a rather strange metaphysical picture of the world: if there are objects,
and if we take an object to be a proper subsystem of the universe, then the
properties of those objects are typically relational; because of entanglement,
objects may have an infinite number of relational properties, many of which
5There will always be some observable for which OψiS′ = +1.
6By “reliable” I mean that when we ask him whether he has a measurement record, if
he has one then he will answer that he does; if he does not have one, he will answer that
he does not.
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are contradictory with one another; because of a distinction we must draw
between the local and the global level for not only perspectives but also
objects, it is unclear what exactly constitutes an object.
The implications that can be drawn from this metaphysical picture, seem
to go against our intuitions about how the world is at its most fundamental
level. If properties are typically relational, then this seems to imply that
there are no intrinsic properties of objects, which then leads one to question
how we are meant to individuate objects if not by their intrinsic properties.
If objects have an infinite number of relational properties, then it is unclear
whether some proper subset of them is sufficient for the individuation of
objects. If the objects that I am interacting with on a daily basis are merely
the local parts of a global object, and if those local parts have a different
character from the global whole, then it is unclear how I am to understand
what a global object even is.
All of these problems stem from the RFI attempt to account for value-
definiteness in our measurements. Some might argue that the price RFI
exacts is higher than its worth [3]. However, the questions and problems
with the RFI are generally no more intractable than problems we already
face in a more garden-variety metaphysics. Their solutions come from the
standard metaphysical literature and can be readily adapted to the context
of a purely relational metaphysics.7
It may be noted that the RFI is very similar in structure to a MWI. It
borrows liberally from Simon Saunders’ solutions to some problems faced
by any interpreter of Everett ([35], [36], [37], [38] and [39]). Where MWI
theorists and the RFI part ways is over the question of how many worlds
there are. MWI theorists generally reify branches and take each to be, or
be describing, an actual world. The RFI, on the other hand, does not reify
the branches. It takes them to be partial descriptions of “the way the world
is”, but each branch is certainly not a physical world that has an equal claim
to be called the actual world.8 In any regard, one owes an explanation of
Everett’s claim that all the branches are equally “actual”. To get an answer
to this in the context of the RFI, it is first important that we consider how
the RFI proposes we understand objects, for only then can we consider how
we are to make sense of the claim that they “actually” have most all possible
7The argument for these claims goes beyond the scope of this project, but it is possible
to make them.
8David Albert and Jeff Barrett have also argued that whatever the branches are taken
to be, they cannot possibly be real physical worlds [2].
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values for most all of their properties.
2.2.1 ObjectsG and ObjectsL
The metaphysics implied by the RFI is a purely relational metaphysics. This
means that generally all facts about objects are relations and that all their
properties are relational. So it would seem that perhaps even the notion of
an object is relational and that solid, stable objects disappear on this meta-
physics. But we have to be careful here. We need to make two distinctions
at this point: (i) between an observerG and an observerL and (ii) between
an objectG and an objectL.
An observerG is the one who has access to all branches of a superposi-
tion. An observerG can be thought of as someone outside the theory who can
see the branching structure of the world and who knows every outcome of
quantum mechanical experiments. In contrast, an observerL is an observer
who experiences determinate measurement results when conducting quan-
tum mechanical experiments; an observerL only sees one outcome of every
experiment. We as observersL do not seem to have access to the experiences
of observersG.
An objectG is the object that is generally in an infinitely complex entan-
gled superposition of all the values of its properties and with all objects it
encounters. An objectL is the object that has relational properties and that
is partially described by one term of the objectG’s state, written in some ba-
sis. This is true for both microscopic objects and macroscopic objects ([15],
pp. 86-87).9
9There are deep epistemological issues involving our knowledge of the worldG and
objectsG. If we take past experience to be indicative of our typical epistemic access to the
world, then it seems that we do not have a perspectiveG on the universe, and as observersL
it is unclear whether we can ever get such access. However, I take the limitation to be not
a limitation in principle, but rather a practical limitation. It has been suggested that there
is a way, in principle, to have evidence of the structureG of the world [1]. Whether the
limitation is one of principle or practicality, the fact remains that we seem to be limited
to a perspectiveL. Why it is that we do not have, and do not see how we can gain, a
perspectiveG on the universe, are worthy questions, but they go beyond the scope of this
paper. Since we are observersL, and as such do not seem to ever have epistemic access
to objectsG in order to investigate what we can learn about their nature, we will have to
be satisfied with investigating what the RFI tells us is true about objectsG. While this
story might not accord with our intuition about objects in general, I would argue that
the misgivings one might feel regarding this metaphysical picture of objects are rooted in
epistemological rather than metaphysical concerns, concerns that we are not considering
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Let us consider a system that consists of an object (without first making
a distinction between objectL and objectG) and an observer. If the object, O,
is in an eigenstate of z -spin up, then we know that it is in a superposition of
being x -spin up and x -spin down. If an observer measures the x -spin of the
particle, then she will enter into an entangled superposition with the object.
Their state can be described this way:
1√
2
(| ↑x〉O|“x− spin up”〉observer + | ↓x〉O|“x− spin down”〉observer)
This is the state of the objectG and the observerG. Each of the two terms
describes a different objectL and observerL. So | ↑x〉O|“x − spin up”〉observer
describes an x -spin up objectL and an observerL getting “x -spin up” as the
result of her measurement of that objectL, and | ↓x〉O|“x−spin down”〉observer
describes an x -spin down object and an observerL getting “x -spin down” as
the result of her measurement of that objectL.
So, in a sense, each objectL is a part of an objectG. In the above example,
there is an objectL that is x -spin up, relative to the branch on which it finds
itself, that is a part of the objectG, and there is an objectL that is x -spin
down, relative to the branch on which it finds itself, that is a part of the
objectG.
10 Additionally we can say that each objectL has a counterpart of
itself on another branch. So the objectL with the relative property x -spin up
has a counterpart objectL with the relative property x -spin down.
2.2.2 Individuating Objects
It might be thought that a purely relational metaphysics leaves us with not
only a relative notion of facts and properties, but of objects themselves,
thereby eliminating any notion of stable, solid objects. But the situation
is not this dire. We still have solid objects: the objectsL. They are the
objects that we encounter in our everyday life. We find ourselves in less
familiar territory when we consider the nature of objectsG and how we are
to individuate them, but since what mainly concerns us here are objectsL,
we will sidestep the issues that arise for objectsG.
here.
10There are problems with self-location that may need to be resolved, but to discuss
them here would take us far afield of the subject at hand. For the purposes of this paper,
suffice it to say that self-location is not an issue. For discussions of the issue of self-location
in the context of a MWI, see [26], [27], [41], [44], and [45].
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I propose that we consider an objectL to be individuated by the bundle
of its (relational) properties.11 This should cause little difficulty for the
individuation of objectsL. Even pre-theoretically, objects in our world are
such that they have many unique relations to other objects that can help us
to differentiate them from each other. But there are several reasons why one
might raise an objection to such an idea.
One place where a problem might arise is in the context of a world like
that suggested by Max Black in which the only things that exist are two ap-
parently identical spheres [4]. In the context of the RFI they would share all
their relational properties with one another and so it would seem that they
would be incapable of being differentiated. But the present metaphysical pic-
ture does not introduce any more difficulty with the verification of Leibniz’s
Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in the context of this example than
already exists in a more traditional metaphysics of objects and properties.
A second potential problem comes in at the quantum level. There are
quantum objects that have all of their properties, relational or otherwise,
in common. It has been argued, independent of our concerns here, that
Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is either inapplicable or
invalid in the realm of quantum mechanics.12 So, again, I do not see that the
metaphysics proposed here adds any difficulty to this problem.13
A third problem, that seems to be unique to the present metaphysics, is
that one might think that because of entanglement, objects have an infinite
number of relational properties, and it is unclear how we are to choose which
among those are necessary or sufficient for the individuation of an object.
But this is to lose sight of the distinction that we drew between objectsL and
objectsG. ObjectsL have no more properties than objects do on a standard,
garden-variety metaphysics, their properties just happen to be relational.
Now that we have some sense of what it is that we are taking to be objects
and how we are to individuate them, let us consider more carefully what it
is that we mean when we say that an objectL’s properties are all relational
11See [12] for an argument that this is a coherent way to treat objects.
12See [21], [22], [23], [32] and [40]. A good bibliography of the literature can be found
in [40].
13And, in fact, in [22] French argues that one suggestion for recovering a supervenience
basis for relational properties even in non-separable entangled states (the bundle theory) is
not feasible due to the fact that Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles needs
to be invoked. However, he rejects this possibility in the context of quantum mechanics
(pp. 15-6).
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and how it is that we seem to get determinate values when we measure the
properties of an objectL. Without a single determinate measurement record,
it is far from clear how anyone could claim that objects “actually” have most
all the possible values of most all of their properties.
2.3 The Relational Properties of Objects
ObjectsL seem to have determinate properties, but if we allow quantum me-
chanics, our best physical description of the world, to inform our answers as
to why things happen the way we seem to perceive them, then a question
that has a (perhaps) surprising surfeit of answers is: Why does it appear to
me that my coffee cup is on my desk?
In an effort to understand how one gets determinate measurement records,
in the context of a MWI, Simon Saunders presents a very compelling analogy
between relational facts and tensed facts ([34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39]).
Despite the differences between the RFI and any MWI, the analogy that
Saunders suggests as the justification for the use of branch indexicals in his
MWI to confer value-definiteness on measurement records can also be used
to understand value-definiteness in the RFI.
Let us continue to leave aside questions of epistemology. Let us assume
that what appears to be the case, is in fact the case, and that we are tracking
the truth about the world when we make statements about how the world
appears to us. Then, there must be something about the world that makes
the proposition
(1) My coffee cup is on my desk.
true—this is what is known as the truthmaker principle. But the nature
of the truthmaker of (1) is up for debate. Different interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics will take different positions in the debate. The standard
interpretation of quantum mechanics says that the truthmaker for (1) is an
absolute fact about the coffee cup. But on the RFI, objectsL do not have
absolute properties. Typically all properties of objectsL are relations and so
typically all facts about objectsL are relations.
Saunders has proposed that we understand the truthmaker for (1) anal-
ogously to the way B-theorists about time understand the truthmaker for a
proposition like:
9
(2) My coffee cup was at home.
A B-theorist takes the truthmaker for (2) to be a fundamentally relational
fact.
Saunders draws an analogy between what he takes to be the nature of
the truthmaker for a proposition about the property of an object and what a
B-theorist takes to be the nature of the truthmaker for a proposition about
the property of an event:
(3) Event e is past.
In both cases the truthmaker is some fundamentally relative fact.14
On both Saunders’ E-relativism and on the RFI, most every physical
systemG will typically have most every possible relative value for a property,
just as every event has all of the qualities of past, present and future. So, it
is true to say:15
(4) X has value x.
and
(5) X has value x′.
even if x 6= x′, and the two are mutually exclusive. But if so, then (4)
and (5) are contradictory.
However, if we now introduce two parameters, Y and Y ′, such that
Y 6= Y ′, and that themselves can take values, we can restate (4) and (5)
as:
14It may be noted that Saunders’ analogy can be read as implying two different commit-
ments on the number of worlds that exist. Prima facie, the analogy implies that there is
only one world, and this is how Barrett understands him in [3]. We do not need different
worlds to explain relational tensed facts, and so, if we take the analogy seriously, we should
not need different worlds to explain relational value-definiteness. On the other hand, one
may argue that many worlds are required to explain relational value-definiteness. Each
fact is determinate relative to the world in which it obtains. This may be seen as one point
at which the analogy breaks down. Saunders has indicated that the many worlds view is
the one from which he considers himself to be working (in personal correspondence), but
he does not discuss this potential point of disanalogy.
15What follows is adapted from [35].
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(6) X has value x relative to Y having value y.
(7) X has value x′ relative to Y ′ having value y′.
It is clear that (6) and (7) are not contradictory.
On this view, an event’s having a seemingly particular (tensed) time is
analogous to an object having a seemingly particular (determinate) value
for a property. An event happened in the past (or future) relative to an-
other time. Likewise, an objectL has a determinate value relative to some
parameter.
By relativizing the property of an object, what we are doing is explicitly
changing the focus of our discussion from that of the properties of an objectG
to that of the properties of an objectL. So in (4) and (5) it is to XG that we
are referring, but in (6) and (7) it is to X L that we are referring.
The question then becomes, what are the relativizing parameters Y and
Y ′? For Saunders, the parameters are worlds, or branches.16 In light of this,
consider again (1). In analogy with the B-theory, one recourse for explaining
its truth (when it is in fact true) is to say that it is true because there is a
determinate relative fact that consists in the coffee cup being on my desk.
Each possible fact about the value for the coffee cupG’s position occurs in a
different world. So Saunders makes sense of the truth of a proposition like (1)
by relativizing the cupL’s position value to the world in which it finds itself.
Relative to being in this world, the coffee cupL is on my desk; relative to
being in a different world, the coffee cupL is in the Mariana Trench; relative
to being in yet another world, the coffee cupL is in my mother’s kitchen.
Thus, the fact that makes (1) true is a relation between the position value
for the coffee cupL and the world in which the coffee cupL finds itself.
Saunders is a bit more precise about the target of relativization. Since the
coffee cupG is entangled with everything else that makes up its system, we
need to isolate the determinate property with which we are concerned. There
are (at least) two options for the target of relativization, the collection of
properties of the world in the here and now, and the collection of properties
that make up a description of the entire history of the world. Saunders
suggests we choose the former ([35], pp. 243-4). In other words, the coffee
16The terms “world” and “branch” are most often used interchangeably in the many
worlds literature. For a discussion of some of the philosophical differences between the
two, see [5].
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cupL’s position is relative to a branch at a particular time.
The RFI defines the parameters Y and Y ′ a bit differently; the target of
relativization for the RFI should be taken to be the (relative) state of the
complement of the system that we are considering. So while the coffee cupG
has many possible values for its position, each value is relative to something
different and goes to make up a partial description of a different coffee cupL,
many of which are counterparts of others. So we can make sense of the truth
of a proposition like (1) by relativizing a coffee cupL’s position to the state
of the complement of the system of which it is a part.
Of course I also have to be a bit more precise when identifying the target
of relativization since we are taking entanglement to be understood as non-
separability, and since the coffee cupG is entangled with everything else that
makes up its system. The second relata in the correlation will generally be
a large conjunction of facts. My coffee cupL is on my desk relative to my
having put it there, but also to my desk being in my office, to my not having
knocked the cup off, etc. Of course the fact that my desk is in my office is
relative to some other collection of relative facts about the complement of
its system (the movers that put it there being a part of that), and this goes
on ad infinitum. Likewise my coffee cupL is in the Mariana Trench relative
to my having decided to take a cruise in the Pacific, and my having dropped
my coffee cup over the side of the ship at the right time, etc.
Let us go back to the question with which we began. What is the nature
of the truthmaker for propositions like (1)? The metaphysics here proposed
implies that it is a relative fact. The two relata of this fact are a relative
fact about the coffee cupL and the conjunction of relative facts about the
complement of the system of which the coffee cup is a part. So now that we
understand how an objectL comes to have determinate properties, we must
address the question of the quote from Everett with which we began this
paper.
On the most popular and influential reading of the note added in proof,
the coffee cupL actually has all of the possible values for position, in the
full sense of “actually” that we have come to expect: it actually has the
property of being on my desk and it actually has the property of being in the
Mariana Trench (among others), and these two properties are not the same
and are (generally) mutually exclusive. Saunders shows how we can dissolve
the apparent contradiction in the context of E-relativism by extending the
analogy with tense and relativizing “actually” in the same way one relativizes
“now” ([35]). The RFI can also use a relativization mechanism like that used
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by Saunders to dissolve the apparent contradiction. But this account requires
a shift in the way we understand Everett’s footnote.
3 Note added in proof
3.1 The Now and the Actual
In the context of the RFI we can relativize to branches. But since the RFI
does not take branches to be actual worlds, it owes an explanation of Everett’s
claim that “From the viewpoint of the theory all elements of a superposition
(all ‘branches’) are ‘actual,’ none any more ‘real’ than the rest”. We can
try to make sense of what Everett may have meant by taking seriously both
his claim that this assertion is made “from the viewpoint of the theory” and
by considering responses Everett made to critiques of and comments on his
thesis.
Consider first the “viewpoint of the theory”. What Everett writes to
Bryce DeWitt regarding this, while discussing the nature and purpose of his
(Everett’s) theory, qua physical theory, is the following:
To me, any physical theory is a logical construct (model) consist-
ing of symbols and rules for their manipulation, some of whose
elements are associated with elements of the perceived world...
When one is using a theory, one naturally pretends that the con-
structs of the theory are “real” or “exist.” If the theory is highly
successful (i.e. correctly predicts the sense perceptions of the
user of the theory) then the confidence in the theory is built up
and its constructs tend to be identified “elements of real physi-
cal world.” This is, however, a purely psychological matter. No
mental constructs (and this goes for everyday, prescientific con-
ceptions about the nature of things, objects, etc., as well as ele-
ments of formal theories) should ever be regarded as more “real”
than any others. We simply have more confidence in some than
others ([18], 1-2, Everett’s emphasis).17
Everett then goes on to deliver the precursor to the footnote:
17These ideas also appears in the second appendix to the long thesis ([15], pp. 133-37).
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From the viewpoint of the theory, all elements of a superposition
(all “branches”) are “actual,” none any more “real” than another.
It is completely unnecessary to suppose that after an observation
somehow one element of the final superposition is selected to be
awarded with a mysterious quality called “reality” and the others
condemned to oblivion. We can be more charitable and allow the
others to coexist – they won’t cause any trouble anyway because
all the separate elements of the superposition (“branches”) in-
dividually obey the wave equation with complete indifference to
the presence or absence (“actuality” or not) of any other elements
([18], 3).
In my view, Everett’s use of scare quotes here and in his footnote, is
meant to indicate that he is speaking from within the theory when he talks
about the reality or actuality of the terms of the superposition. In the theory,
each element of the superposition should have the same level of reality as any
other. After all, when doing the mathematics of physics, one does not write
the global state of the universe in some basis, pick out one of the terms of the
superposition, call it the real world by fiat and then ignore the other terms.
Neither, according to Everett, is one term selected in some mysterious way
to become the real world and all the others then disappear. But of course it
is not sufficient to merely talk about what is happening within the theory.
We want to be able to make sense of the universe that is described by the
theory. So we should consider what this means for our everyday physical
universe.
In April, 1957, Norbert Wiener wrote a letter to Everett and John Wheeler.
Wiener also seemed interested in the implications of Everett’s theory for the
real world. Wiener writes: “Another point where your theory needs ampli-
fication... is that I do not find an adequate discussion of what it means to
say that a certain fact or a certain group of facts is actually realized.” In the
margins of Everett’s copy of that letter Everett responds:
...no such statements ever made in theory like “case A actually
realized”, except relative to some other state! All possibilities
“actually realized”, with corresp[onding] observer states ([46],
marginalia, page 3, Everett’s emphasis).
In his formal response to Wiener, Everett crafts this as:
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You also raise the question of what it means to say that a fact or
a group of facts is actually realized. Now I realize that this ques-
tion poses a serious difficulty for the conventional formulation of
quantum mechanics, and was in fact one of the main motives for
my reformulation. The difficulty is removed in the new formula-
tion, however, since it is quite unnecessary in this theory ever to
say anything like “Case A is actually realized.”
Since I have discussed this point of the transition from “possible
to actual” with Dr. Bryce DeWitt, who also raised the question,
I am enclosing a copy of our correspondence in lieu of a fuller
discussion here ([17], p. 1. The letter from Everett to DeWitt to
which Everett is referring is presumably [18], the relevant sections
having been quoted just above.).
Here Everett is explicit that the states of things are actual only relative
to the state of some other subsystem. Though he drops the phrase “except
relative to some other state” in his formal response to Wiener, when Everett
writes, “it is quite unnecessary in this theory ever to say anything like ‘Case
A is actually realized,’ ” I take him to mean that we will never utter that
phrase and come to a full stop. We will only utter that phrase when it is
followed by a suitable relativizing phrase such as “relative to some observer
state”, or “relative to some other state”.
If we accept this interpretation of the footnote, then according to Ev-
erett, the following two statements are not both true, contrary to the MWI
theorists’s claims:
(8) The coffee cup is actually on my desk.
(9) The coffee cup is actually in the Mariana Trench.
What is true however are these statements:
(10) My coffee cup is actually on my desk relative to my having put it
there...18
(11) My coffee cup is actually in the Mariana Trench relative to my having
dropped it there...
18The ellipses indicate that the target of relativization, as we know, is more complex
than just one statement.
15
Each of (10) and (11) are actually realized in relation to the state of the
complement of the coffee cup’s system. So, relative to my sitting at my desk,
writing this, having gotten a cup of coffee earlier, ..., my coffee cup is ac-
tually on my desk. Relative to my sitting in a deck chair on a cruise ship
in the Pacific Ocean, lamenting having dropped my coffee cup over the side
this morning, ..., my coffee cup is actually in the Mariana Trench. This is
nothing more exotic than two partial descriptions of the actual world, each
with a different target of relativization. Using myself sitting at my desk as
part of the target of relativization, the world described in part by (10) is
the actual world. Using myself sitting on a cruise ship as part of the target
of relativization, the world described in part by (11) is the actual world. I
happen to be the IL who is living in the world described in part by (10) and
so that world is actual relative, in part, to me. But that does not mean
that the world described in part by (11) does not have equal claim to be the
actual world relative to the counterpart of myself who is part of the target of
relativization for that system state.
So what we have now is an account of what Everett could have meant
when he claimed that every element of a superposition is equally “actual”
or equally “real”. It does not require the reification of multiple branches,
as proposed by the MWI theorists. The job can be done with one world
and relative facts. We also have an account of how our measurement records
come out to be determinate: they are records of determinate relative facts. I
have argued that we can use the analogy drawn by Saunders between tense
and value-definiteness to explain value-definiteness in the context of the RFI,
despite the fact that pure wave mechanics predicts that objects will generally
not have determinate values for their properties. We first make a distinction
between objectsG and objectsL. Then by relativizing to the complement of
the system of the object under consideration, we explain that an object has a
determinate value for a property only relative to that target of relativization.
What underlies everything that has gone thus far, is Everett’s fundamental
idea that the value of any system is determinate only relative to its comple-
ment.
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Appendices
A The note added in proof
Everett writes:
We thus arrive at the following picture: Throughout all of a se-
quence of observation processes there is only one physical system
representing the observer, yet there is no single unique state of
the observer (which follows from the representations of interact-
ing systems). Nevertheless, there is a representation in terms of a
superposition, each element of which contains a definite observer
state and a corresponding system state. Thus with each succeed-
ing observation (or interaction), the observer state “branches”
into a number of different states. Each branch represents a differ-
ent outcome of the measurement and the corresponding eigenstate
for the object-system state. All branches exist simultaneously in
the superposition after any given sequence of observations.‡
‡Note added in proof.—In reply to a preprint of this article some
correspondents have raised the question of the “transition from
possible to actual,” arguing that in “reality” there is—as our ex-
perience testifies—no such splitting of observer states, so that
only one branch can ever actually exist. Since this point may
occur to other readers the following is offered in explanation.
The whole issue of the transition from “possible” to “actual” is
taken care of in the theory in a very simple way—there is no such
transition, nor is such a transition necessary for the theory to be
in accord with our experience. From the viewpoint of the the-
ory all elements of a superposition (all “branches”) are “actual,”
none any more “real” than the rest. It is unnecessary to suppose
that all but one are somehow destroyed, since all the separate
elements of a superposition individually obey the wave equation
with complete indifference to the presence or absence (“actual-
ity” or not) of any other element. This total lack of effect of
one branch on another also implies that no observer will ever be
aware of any “splitting” process.
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Arguments that the world picture presented by this theory is con-
tradicted by experience, because we are unaware of any branching
process, are like the criticism of the Copernican theory that the
mobility of the earth as a real physical fact is incompatible with
the common sense interpretation of nature because we feel no
such motion. In both cases the argument fails when it is shown
that the theory itself predicts that our experience will be what
it in fact is. (In the Copernican case the addition of Newtonian
physics was required to be able to show that the earth’s inhabi-
tants would be unaware of any motion of the earth.) ([16], 146-7).
clearpage
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